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Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and 
Generosity in a Connected Age by 
Clay Shirky. New York: Penguin 
Press, 2010. Pp. 448. $39.95 cloth.
Mashed Up: Music, Technology, 
and the Rise of Configurable 
Culture by Aram Sinnreich. 
Science/Technology/Culture 
series. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2010. Pp. 
240, 10 illustrations. $80.00 cloth, 
$24.95 paper.
For a New Critique of Political 
Economy by Bernard Stiegler. 
Translated by Daniel Ross. 
Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2010. Pp. 
154. $14.95 paper.
Surveying the landscape of mid-
century industrial society, Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer ob-
served the strange role of variety 
in consumer and cultural goods. 
The techniques of mass production 
in the factories and studio system 
had, oddly enough, managed to 
produce not a surface of sameness, 
but a great diversity of things. On 
the one hand, however, the diver-
sity of goods that faced consumers 
was merely apparent, decipherable 
as false by “any child with a keen 
interest in variety.” On the other 
hand, the variety of offerings on 
the market was functional and ef-
fective at securing the social order. 
“Something is provided for all,” 
Adorno and Horkheimer gloom-
ily observed, “so that none may 
escape.”1 If the Frankfurt school 
theorists could peer into contempo-
rary culture, they would observe a 
stunning intensification of variety, 
as well as a search engine–opti-
mized system for identifying and 
catering to niche desires that would 
make their imagined color-coded 
advertising maps seem quaint by 
comparison. The difference be-
tween the cultural consumption 
analyzed by Adorno and Hork-
heimer and today’s practices is not 
the variety, which has only prolifer-
ated. Rather, it is the unidirectional 
character of being provided for. The 
subject of the industrial society is 
positioned as passive in this regard, 
whereas the consuming subject 
today is active and productive: the 
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famous prosumer we’ve heard so 
much about.
Today, as we’re told in nearly 
every Web 2.0 business book, con-
sumers are not merely provided 
with a variety of goods. Prosumers 
actively codevelop and coproduce; 
successful production depends on 
empowering prosumers and valu-
ing their contributions. And such 
statements need not be read cyni-
cally. The principle of free and open 
source software production—that 
users will identify bugs and needed 
features and contribute code as a 
common resource— actually seems 
to work, and work beyond the lim-
ited sphere of software program-
ming. People contribute videos on 
YouTube; contribute T-shirt de-
signs and ratings on Threadless; 
contribute entries and up to the 
minute updates on Wikipedia; con-
tribute to the marketing of bands, 
films, books, political candidates by 
sharing, linking, and liking them 
on Facebook; contribute images 
on Flickr; contribute artwork and 
music and poetry with Creative 
Commons licenses; contribute end-
less commentary, opinions, fan fic-
tion, breaking news, and survey 
data on Twitter, on blogs, and on 
news sites; and so on. This is, in-
deed, where the first version of the 
World Wide Web fell short, still 
asking its users to submit informa-
tion, in order to be better provided 
for. The shift from the submit 
button of Web 1.0 to the share 
button of Web 2.0 can, from this 
perspective, be seen as the pu-
tatively radical shift away from 
being-provided-for and toward 
contribution. It was, of course, one 
of the signal achievements of cul-
tural studies (or its most notable 
ideological production—the jury’s 
still out), to show that the passive 
consumer of Adorno and Hork-
heimer’s account was never quite 
as passive as they imagined, but if 
the variety of goods they saw fac-
ing the consumer has multiplied 
exponentially, the condition of 
 being-provided-for has shifted its 
directionality completely. The first 
clause of their famous diagnosis—
“Something is provided for all”—
might be better rewritten today as 
“Everyone may contribute.”
The second clause is trickier. 
All this contribution in the area of 
new media is regarded as the es-
cape itself, an escape from the pas-
sivity, limitations, and gatekeeping 
functions of the old media. Using 
Twitter, in this sense, is not merely 
a matter of coproducing the infor-
mation sphere. It is, both in the ag-
gregate and at the individual level a 
reassertion of publicness that both 
overcomes and surpasses the limits 
and controls of mass media. This 
is, of course, well-worn territory. 
The notion that people are empow-
ered by all this contribution might 
even be the dominant thought of 
our current media sphere. If there 
are disputes, they revolve around 
whether such contributions are 
repressed and restricted (through 
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intellectual property laws), or even-
tually co-opted, folded into the very 
media systems from which they are 
thought to free people.
The positions are perhaps less 
clear-cut in other areas of contri-
bution. The value of the state as 
the provider of last resort seems to 
experience a dramatic price drop 
just as the tendency to contrib-
ute media content explodes; today 
consumers contribute, sometimes 
indirectly and sometimes deliber-
ately, the now commonplace “por-
tion of the proceeds” to all kinds 
of charitable causes. The number 
of grant-making foundations has 
more than tripled since 1975, while 
independent giving and corporate 
foundation giving have both seen 
similar growth since the late 1980s. 
It might be easy enough, then, to 
detect the resonance between what 
Richard Barbrook famously labeled 
the “Hi-Tech Gift Economy” that 
we see emerging on the Internet 
and growth in the nonprofit sector 
(the low-tech gift economy?) since 
the 1970s and 1980s. If being-pro-
vided-for invokes the passive con-
sumer of the bad old days in Web 
2.0 discourse, it might also invoke 
the so-called entitlements of the in-
dustrial state apparatus, themselves 
everywhere under threat.2
Other kinds of contributions 
that emerged from and became 
common since the 1970s and 1980s 
could be added to the mix, especially 
in the area of finance. In describing 
what he calls financialization, or the 
“diversion of savings from house-
hold economies to . . . securities,” 
economist Christian Marazzi high-
lights the role of the defined-con-
tribution plan: “[I]t was 1981 that 
saw the first defined-contribution 
pension plan, the 401(k) program, 
which, differently from the ear-
lier defined-benefit plans, makes 
pension fund benefits dependent 
on returns from the securities in 
which the funds are invested.” 
The emergence of the 401(k) and 
similar contribution plans was con-
nected, according to Marazzi, with 
the late-1970s “politico-economic 
crisis of the international Ford-
ist model;” financialization was 
driven by monetary policies and 
other policy decisions that had as 
their goal “draining off savings in 
order to reinforce stock market fi-
nancing of the economy” (16–17). 
The old defined-benefit pensions 
of the manufacturing sector might 
thus be aligned with the being-
provided-for model of Fordism. 
The subject participating in the 
defined-contribution plan, on the 
other hand, looks much more like 
the prosumer (a term itself, inci-
dentally, invented during the same 
period) when it comes to the status 
of and relationship to the fund. In 
the recent labor protests in Wiscon-
sin, labor activists focused primar-
ily on the efforts of the conservative 
governor and legislature to strip 
public employee unions of their col-
lective bargaining rights, which the 
activists identified as the long-term 
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threat. The more immediate ques-
tion, however, involved the level of 
contribution to state employee re-
tirement funds: how much should 
be contributed (which is to say, pro-
vided) by the state, and how much 
should be contributed by individu-
als. The unions offered near total 
concessions on this question, pre-
sumably a political and rhetorical 
loser.3
Mashing up these admittedly 
very different domains can be jus-
tified, I hope, if the resultant mix 
serves to open or extend investiga-
tions that critically parse out and 
examine the forms of contribution 
people engage in, and their politi-
cal, economic, and aesthetic func-
tions. Much of the critical inquiry 
around what we’ve called, in this 
issue, open source culture has po-
sitioned its practices against tra-
ditional models of property and 
economic organization, or against 
originality in aesthetic produc-
tion. Viewing contribution as a 
generalizable diagram, one that 
displaces and supplants being-
provided-for in multiple domains, 
may open such inquiry to new 
questions. What, for example, are 
the resonances between tax policy, 
the global nonprofit sector, and the 
desire to share images? How do 
subjectivities related to contem-
porary finance capital—and the 
recent financial crisis—relate to 
the aesthetics of DJing, or corpo-
rate contributions of code to open 
source projects? Such questions, to 
be sure, sound a discordant note at 
first. The beats may match better 
when we learn that a primary area 
of tension in free and open source 
projects today is the character of 
contribution agreements, which 
stipulate the legal status of contrib-
uted code; the other time people 
commonly encounter contribution 
agreements is, of course, when they 
sign up for their 401(k) or 403(b) 
plans.
The three texts under review 
here provide readers with an entry 
into mixed forms of contribution 
by working through the character 
of contribution in multiple politi-
cal, economic, and aesthetic reg-
isters. In both its argument and 
accessible style, Clay Shirky’s Cog-
nitive Surplus is perhaps the most 
familiar, especially to readers of 
other popular studies of network 
culture, or, indeed, Shirky’s pre-
vious blockbuster Here Comes 
Everybody: The Power of Organiz-
ing Without Organizations (2008). 
While Shirky remains fascinated 
by the way individual contribution 
to collective projects seems to liber-
ate people from the old restrictive 
structures of being-provided-for, 
Cognitive Surplus’s most fruitful 
aspect is Shirky’s attempt to locate 
such contribution within distinct 
social and technological systems 
while also evaluating the social and 
political effects of such generosity. 
A far more direct engagement with 
the political economy of contribu-
tion, and particularly its relation 
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to finance capital, can be found in 
Bernard Stiegler’s short collection 
of modified lectures, For a New 
Critique of Political Economy. Much 
like Shirky, Stiegler sees what he 
calls an “economy of contribution” 
as intimately related with nonwork 
time. Unlike Shirky (who—sur-
prisingly, given his book’s eco-
nomic focus and 2010 publication 
date—does not discuss the financial 
crisis at all), Stiegler seeks to posi-
tion contribution as an alternative 
not merely to the old industrial 
economy but also to a neoliberal fi-
nance capital.
Aram Sinnreich’s Mashed Up 
takes up the political-economic 
question in an aesthetic register, 
focusing on that most notable of 
emerging aesthetic forms: the music 
mashup. Mashed Up provides a use-
ful set of categories for evaluating 
emerging aesthetic practices that 
have most occasioned definitional 
disputes on the nature of contribu-
tion and property; it is especially 
valuable for its attempt to dem-
onstrate gradations within those 
practices. While Sinnreich partakes 
in the by now familiar moves of 
juxtaposing restrictive social forms 
of modernity with newer, and pre-
sumably less hierarchical or elitist, 
practices, Mashed Up is nevertheless 
intent on showing how these new 
practices develop their own sets of 
values, how deterritorialized music 
is reterritorialized.
Together, then, the three books 
reviewed here may demonstrate 
that a discourse almost numbingly 
obsessed with intellectual property 
disputes is turning to other mat-
ters, examining the constitutive 
elements and power arrangements 
immanent to emerging cultural 
production or examining open 
source culture’s relationships with 
other spheres of activity.
If one question has occupied 
nearly all commentators on net-
work culture, it might be this: 
Why do people contribute cre-
ative works—from software code 
to novels to music—so freely on 
digital networks? In Cognitive Sur-
plus, Shirky seeks to explain this 
phenomenon by developing the 
concept of a cognitive surplus and 
detailing the conditions that both 
create it and enable it to function. 
The cognitive surplus is created by 
the “amount of unstructured time 
cumulatively available to educated 
populations,” particularly after the 
Second World War—free time that 
“began to add up to billions of col-
lective hours per year” (4–5). The 
book’s primary historical claim is 
straightforward: this free time was 
occupied, cognitively, by techno-
logical forms that promoted pas-
sivity or “pure consumption of 
media,” particularly television (15). 
It is here that Shirky may be clos-
est to Adorno and Horkheimer, 
replaying the trope of movement 
from submit to share that marks 
so much similar work. What the 
emergence of networks makes avail-
able is the transformation of the 
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surplus into “behaviors other than 
passive consumption” (11). Shirky’s 
first goal is to analyze the technico-
social configuration that generates 
such behaviors, or what he calls the 
means, motives, and opportunities 
that transform the “raw material” 
of the cognitive surplus into some-
thing that produces meaning and 
value.
This odd factory for transform-
ing the raw material of cognitive 
surplus involves, first, tools. Shirky 
tells a story by now familiar to stu-
dents of both print and Internet 
culture, in which the age of passive 
consumption really begins with 
the printing press, which involved 
multiple economic risks and the 
kinds of scarcity such risks pro-
duced. With the emergence of the 
Internet as a tool, what we encoun-
ter, rather, is abundance, a condi-
tion that scrambles our evaluative 
categories. While it was always 
clear that the particular emergence 
of print was historically contingent, 
it is more difficult to detect the con-
tingency of all the social valuations 
that emerged alongside it. If people 
still have trouble processing the aes-
thetic value of contributions, Shirky 
suggests, it is because “abundance 
can remove trade-offs we’re used 
to,” and so “can be disorienting to 
the people who’ve grown up with 
scarcity” (49). The communication 
tools, no longer controlled and no 
longer scarce, make traditional 
evaluative categories difficult but 
are always in the process of creating 
new possibilities. With the tools for 
abundant social sharing now in 
people’s hands, Shirky turns to the 
thorny question of motives. “The 
novel modes of charity” emerging 
on networks, Shirky suggests, “rely 
not only on the existence of tools 
that connect us and let us volunteer 
our time, talents, or money; they 
rely on our being motivated to do 
so as well” (82).
On this point, Shirky is perhaps 
at his least historical. Drawing on 
psychological and economic stud-
ies, Shirky argues that “intrinsic 
motivations”—among them de-
sires for autonomy, competence, 
and belonging, or  connectedness—
are “fundamental to human na-
ture” (86). If the previous mode of 
social organization served to re-
strict access to or control over tools 
for contributing and connecting, it 
also served to suppress or redirect 
these innate desires, which were 
restricted to private activities: “Our 
motivations for using those tools 
are the ancient, intrinsic ones, mo-
tivations previously remanded to 
the private sphere but now bursting 
out in public” (95). The machinery 
of human nature through which 
Shirky runs the raw material of the 
cognitive surplus is at the very least 
a cause for raised eyebrows here—
one might suggest that these very 
desires are immanently produced 
within the particular technico-
social configuration, rather than 
preexisting it, and that generaliz-
ing them as an essential “desire for 
 ON CONTRIBUTION SOCIETIES 505
autonomy” (itself a suspect histori-
cal or even cross-cultural category) 
obscures more than it reveals about 
contemporary culture and produc-
tion. It is a suspicion not quelled by 
Shirky’s rather ahistorical modes 
of supporting this fundamental 
claim. His target, however, seems 
to be analysts who would attribute 
emerging cultures of contribution 
to technology alone.
In any case, the desire to con-
tribute meaningfully also requires, 
for Shirky, opportunities (or sites) 
for collaboration and coordination. 
In this regard, Shirky seeks to add 
multiple modes of coordination 
to pure market logics, or find the 
“optimal” mixture of competitive 
and collaborative values that would 
promote both quality production 
and ethical behavior. So, for exam-
ple, the empty swimming pools of 
1970s California provided the right 
competitive and collaborative mix 
for the development of modern 
skateboarding. In other cases, the 
right proportion gravitates against 
competition, as in some free soft-
ware production:
The advances in Apache 
(and in all large free software 
projects) rely on the existence 
of a collaborative group of 
people, and the ability to 
recruit that group and inte-
grate their work has driven 
Apache’s decade-long domi-
nance. Apache doesn’t just 
happen to be noncommercial; 
it has to be noncommercial in 
order to take in contributions 
from as many people as it can 
as cheaply as it can. (116)
The factory that transforms the cog-
nitive surplus into a value involves 
the tools, or technologies, but also 
requires configurations of culture 
that draw out and satisfy desires 
while successfully coordinating a 
group’s knowledge- making activi-
ties and sense of purpose.
Of course, all kinds of groups 
and sharing activities can do that, 
so Shirky seeks to establish a scale 
of value for the kinds of contribu-
tions people make. He turns to this 
question in the last part of the book, 
developing a set of definitions for 
personal, communal, public, and 
civic sharing, placing personal shar-
ing at the lower end of the scale in 
terms of the difficulty of producing 
and maintaining structures, and 
the value created for nonpartici-
pants, while locating civic sharing, 
which takes “improving society as 
its major goal,” at the higher end 
(173–75). This set of categories 
does not yield many surprises—
production and sharing of ICan-
HazCheezburger images occupy 
the lower personal sharing end, 
whereas a Facebook group that ef-
fectively combated a religious sect’s 
attacks against women in the In-
dian city of Mangalore produces 
civic value. The categorization is 
itself, however, a useful heuristic 
for parsing out contributions, or 
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attuning observers to the multiple 
ways contribution, if it is to be read 
as the expression of the surplus 
set loose from formerly restrictive 
structures, transforms both cultural 
production and cultural politics.
While primarily a matter of 
description on its surface, Shirky’s 
text, like much in its popular genre, 
is rhetorical, even evangelical. 
Shirky is asking those who relied 
on the gatekeeping function of 
the cultural industries and other 
forms of creative participation to 
see networks and their forms of 
contributions in a different light. 
It remains odd that a book about 
generosity and emerging forms of 
economy and community could be 
published in the midst of the worst 
financial crisis since the Great De-
pression without even a passing 
mention that financial and hous-
ing  markets—those other spaces of 
coordination both with and against 
which he positions his generosity—
had collapsed in near catastrophic 
failure, throwing millions into 
foreclosure and unemployment.
The absence is no more striking 
than when Shirky addresses the 
question of free labor. The prob-
lem of establishing a labor theory 
of contribution has haunted the 
discourse of open source culture 
almost from its inception; Tiziana 
Terranova’s influential 2000 article 
“Free Labor: Producing Culture 
for the Digital Economy” for-
malized the question for many in 
the academic humanities, but the 
question has persisted in popular 
form whenever the status of con-
tributors has come up.4 As a result, 
most proponents of free culture see 
the need to address the question of 
free labor. Shirky sets up the prob-
lem this way:
People sharing their writing 
or videos or their medical 
symptoms or seats in their 
car are motivated by some-
thing other than money. 
The people running services 
like YouTube and Facebook 
want to get paid, and they do. 
It can seem unfair for ama-
teurs to be contributing their 
work for free to people who 
are making money from ag-
gregating and sharing that 
work. (57)
Shirky’s solution is to compare such 
platforms to a bar where people will 
pay more than they would to drink 
alone in order to feel “a sense of con-
nectedness,” while the bar owner 
will profit from the customers’ 
mere presence, the sense of connect-
edness—the scene, perhaps—they 
create by being there. For Shirky, 
in other words, the entire problem 
is stated incorrectly because it drags 
along a “fifteenth-century publish-
ing model” and thereby presents 
the people contributing to these 
sites as workers, where they should 
be classified differently: “But what 
if the contributors aren’t workers? 
What if they really are contributors, 
 ON CONTRIBUTION SOCIETIES 507
quite specifically intending their 
contributions to be acts of sharing 
rather than production? What if 
their labors are labors of love” (58)? 
The correct economic model for 
thinking the status of contributors 
is thus not the factory or sharecrop-
ping site, but the gathering place. 
The model is further supported by 
a reading of ordinary consciousness, 
as Shirky has it: “[M]ost people af-
fected by this state of affairs don’t 
seem to be terribly up in arms about 
it” (57) (a remarkably unconvinc-
ing addition, since one might say 
the same about any number of ex-
ploitative relationships). While the 
position that these relationships are 
about enjoyment and connectedness 
rather than traditionally conceived 
wage labor may seem somewhat 
tone-deaf as unemployment hov-
ered at near 10 percent, there is a 
sense in which Shirky’s premise is 
correct. It is problematic, at best, to 
import concepts of labor developed 
in an industrial setting—labor as 
being-provided-for—into such ar-
rangements. It is no less problem-
atic, however, to import concepts 
of leisure that were themselves de-
veloped in industrial contexts. This 
is the default move for proponents 
of open source culture (Linus Tor-
valds titled his book Just for Fun: 
The Story of an Accidental Revolu-
tionary [2001] on the development 
of Linux) but is increasingly a case 
where the frequency of justifica-
tions demonstrates their nagging 
insufficiency.
If Shirky’s omission of the finan-
cial crisis has any effect on Cognitive 
Surplus, it is to give the book an al-
most dated feeling, as if the various 
analyses emanated from the hey-
day of such books in the mid-2000s, 
markets humming along (toward 
a cliff), unemployment at 5 per-
cent. This criticism is, to some ex-
tent, unfair—the question may be 
beyond the scope of Shirky’s very 
well targeted rhetorical and taxo-
nomical goals. At the same time, 
popular texts such as Shirky’s on 
open source culture might be prof-
itably combined with more critical 
texts that do connect the historical 
coemergence of such contribution 
networks with neoliberal financial-
ization, as has been the project of 
much Italian autonomist thought 
for the better part of the last decade. 
A key recent text for forging such a 
connection is Bernard Stiegler’s For 
a New Critique of Political Economy.
Stiegler’s short text contains two 
lectures. The first, “For a New Cri-
tique of Political Economy,” was 
adapted from a lecture he deliv-
ered in January 2009. The second, 
“Pharmacology of Capital and 
Economy of Contribution,” was 
delivered in December of that year. 
Both works are direct responses to 
measures taken in the wake of the 
financial crisis, and particularly 
the various stimulus measures de-
signed to reconstitute what Stiegler 
calls the “consumerist model,” 
which he argues is “obsolete” (4). 
At the same time, the short works 
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can be considered summaries of 
Stiegler’s larger projects, such as 
the three volume Technics and 
Time, deploying the conceptual ap-
paratus so central to those works 
(tertiary retention and grammati-
zation, the industrial or technical 
history of memory, and so forth). A 
full exposition of Stiegler’s tightly 
woven and terminologically heavy 
argument would likely require a 
treatment the length of the volume 
itself. For my purposes here, I hope 
merely to locate some consonances 
on the question of contribution.
For Stiegler, the disaster of the 
financial crisis is not accidental but 
a logical outcome of the course of 
capitalist development. The first 
essay traces this development by 
pursuing two themes: the develop-
ment of proletarianization beyond 
Marx’s concept, and a redefinition 
of investment that would coun-
ter speculation. The first theme 
requires Stiegler’s concept of ter-
tiary retention and grammatiza-
tion, which can be defined as the 
exteriorization of various kinds 
of knowledges. If Marx could de-
tect the exteriorization of forms of 
work, or knowledge of making, 
he could not predict the exterior-
ization of forms of life, or knowl-
edge of living, that would come to 
dominate the experience of con-
sumer society. Whereas the first 
kind of proletarianization leads to, 
and Stiegler remains classical on 
this point, the transformation of 
labor power into a commodity, the 
second affects libidinal economy, 
transforming desire into drives. 
The result is an economic system 
in which consumers lose their own 
knowledge of “living,” having both 
their social relationships and mate-
rial desires exteriorized, calculated, 
and packaged for them, while spec-
ulators hurry after satisfaction of 
short-term results rather than tend-
ing to long-term desires. Stiegler 
seeks to redefine investment as an 
ethic of care that extends networks 
and practices (“long circuits of tran-
sindividuation”) into the future 
rather than a system of drives that 
seek short-term returns.
If one concept in the first essay 
connects Stiegler’s analysis to 
Shirky’s, it is otium, or the Roman 
concept of “studious leisure” (53)—
the idea that people work on cre-
ative projects outside the time of 
employment, even necessarily so, 
since the temporality of creative 
or noetic acts never quite maps 
on to a remunerated work time. 
While Stiegler discusses this “time 
of leisure” in reference to the in-
termittents, or temporary cultural 
workers, the outline of free time to 
pursue and share work—as a form 
of work, but not  employment—
comes into focus. It is precisely 
through such incalculable or im-
measurable forms of cognitive work, 
moreover, that Stiegler sees the po-
tential for taking proletarianiza-
tion (and its catastrophic results) in 
another direction: the development 
of alternative practices and forms of 
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work and life, practices that would 
constitute an economic “system of 
care.” Indeed, Stiegler is at his most 
Derridean on this point. As much 
as the proletarianization of cogni-
tive capacities expropriates forms 
of knowledge, it also establishes the 
space in which capital mutates, the 
“rupture through which associated 
milieus are formed” (48). Proletari-
anization, and capital in general, is 
in this sense pharmacological, both 
poison and medicine. Needless to 
say, Marx already told us this, but 
only, Stiegler suggests, in an indus-
trial context. If the factories were 
the site of proletarianization, they 
were also the site where solidarity 
developed. Stiegler’s advance here 
is to recast that dynamic on digi-
tal networks: if networks are the 
site in which cognitive knowledge 
and knowledge of living are exte-
riorized and expropriated, they are 
also the site in which new forms of 
communal practices—transindi-
viduation—emerge. Citing Mack-
enzie Wark’s The Hacker Manifesto 
(2004) and Pikka Himanen’s The 
Hacker Ethic and the Spirit of Capi-
talism (2001), Stiegler portrays 
hackers in general as an example 
of an associated milieu opened up 
by proletarianization. He calls this 
emergence, of course, the “economy 
of  contribution” (70).
Whereas the first essay could 
be seen as a symptomology of 
neoliberal capitalism, the second 
develops the treatment plan. De-
spite the at times dizzying route by 
which Stiegler’s argument travels, 
his conclusions on the economy of 
contribution are, in fact, not that 
different from Shirky’s. The sec-
ond essay ends with a section titled 
“The Economy of Contribution as 
a New Relation between Technical 
System and Social System” (127). 
In this concluding section, Stiegler 
invokes software programmers as 
the paradigm case for an economy 
of contribution that would work as 
the “sociotherapy” to poisonous ele-
ments of capital:
In 1990 Philippe Aigrin and 
myself [sic] put forward the 
idea that the software indus-
try and its digital networks 
will eventually cause asso-
ciated techno-geographical 
milieus of a new kind to ap-
pear, enabling human geog-
raphy to interface with the 
technical system, to make 
it function and, especially, 
to make it evolve, thanks to 
this interfacing: collabora-
tive technologies and free li-
cense software rest precisely 
on the valorization of such 
associated human milieus, 
which also constitute techno-
geographical spaces for the 
formation of positive exter-
nalities. (128–29)
Put more plainly, Stiegler sees free 
and open source software devel-
opment as having the potential 
to develop into an alternative to 
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proletarianization and its attendant 
short-termism. If the pathologies 
of capitalism lead it structurally 
to “carelessness,” these emerging 
forms of activity—in an always 
risky manner, of course—would 
function “contra the economy of 
carelessness” (129).
At times, Stiegler’s analysis of 
contemporary political economy, 
and certainly his initial demand 
that philosophers pay attention 
again to economics and critique, are 
valuable, strikingly original, and 
much needed. At other times, they 
can sound like fairly commonplace 
critiques of the excesses of neolib-
eral capital arrived at through an 
odd process. For example, Stiegler 
provides the following:
“This capital, however, be-
comes purely speculative 
when it no longer measures 
a capital of confidence in the 
future of the assets of the pro-
duction apparatus—in rela-
tion to which it constitutes, 
as a system of anticipations, 
capacities for investment—
but instead relies on op-
erations which are purely 
self- referential (such that an-
ticipations created by the fi-
nancial sub-system anticipate 
nothing but itself and come at 
the expense of the production 
system) or else are oriented 
toward the production ap-
paratus, but are structurally 
short-term (that is, based on 
disinvestment, that is, on the 
pillage of the production ap-
paratus)” (81).
For anyone following the after-
math of the financial crisis, this 
may sound—after extensive exami-
nation—like a fairly complex way 
of restating the Wall Street–Main 
Street or finance capital–produc-
tive industry divide we’ve heard 
so much about (or even summariz-
ing in philosophical terms the plot 
of Oliver Stone’s Wall Street, 1987). 
Even if such moments suggest that 
Stiegler’s view of finance may itself 
be limited by traditional categories 
(investment vs. speculation, for in-
stance), his critique is most useful 
when it raises the question of the 
relationship between the economy 
of contribution and finance capital, 
a question, I’ve suggested through-
out, that requires further examina-
tion. It is also valuable for sketching 
out the subjective components of 
particular practices within an econ-
omy of contribution. Stiegler fo-
cuses on hackers and free and open 
source programmers. I’ll now turn 
to what may be considered another 
location of such activities: the work 
of mashup artists.
Aram Sinnreich’s Mashed Up 
is a sustained and concrete exami-
nation of one particular kind of 
contribution practice: the work of 
mashup artists and its effect on the 
social and aesthetic assumptions of 
modernity. It is, in this sense, both 
a remarkable study on its own and 
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a useful supplement to the more 
generalized analyses provided by 
Shirky and Stiegler. Mashed Up is 
structured in three parts: a theoreti-
cal discussion of music and the way 
its production and consumption are 
organized in societies; an empirical 
examination—consisting mostly of 
Sinnreich’s analysis of interviews—
of the effects of mashup practices 
on the organization of aesthetic 
production and consumption; and 
a prognosis of these changes in a 
closing section. Sinnreich’s thesis 
is a careful one that attends to the 
contemporary moment as a time 
of transition. What we might ob-
serve in mashup practices is the 
“rush to colonize the growing gray 
area” between sets of binaries that 
organized aesthetic production—
especially musical production—in 
modernity.
These binaries depend, first, on 
the social importance of regulating 
music in the first place. Sinnreich 
opens with what may be his most 
startling argument, an analysis of 
Socrates’s statements on music in 
The Republic, which may appear to 
readers of Plato like a series of seem-
ingly esoteric riffs on Dorian and 
Phrygian harmonies. But Sinnreich 
draws out an appropriate premise, 
“that musical aesthetics reflect and 
influence sociopolitical structures, 
and that innovative or challenging 
aesthetics pose a consequent threat 
to powerful institutions” (16). Sin-
nreich fills out this initial observa-
tion by creating a detailed matrix 
through which musical regulation 
and resistance to that regulation 
may be analyzed, with legal, ideo-
logical, and commercial “sites of 
institutional power” and “targets of 
communal power,” on the one side, 
and musical aesthetics, praxes, and 
technologies occupying the “site of 
communal power” and “target of 
institutional power” (31). Where 
these power relations are played 
out, musical innovation occurs: 
“[T]he opposing forces of musical 
regulation and resistance combine 
to alter the very codes and practices 
under dispute” (31).
If the interplay of such power 
relations were the whole story, of 
course, one would expect rapid 
and constant innovation. As Sinn-
reich notes, however, our ideas and 
practices of both producing and 
consuming music have retained a 
notable constancy throughout the 
modern period. The explanation 
can be found in what Sinnreich 
calls the “modern discursive frame-
work,” which “serves as a kind of 
cement, binding together ideas and 
assumptions about how music oper-
ates, and what it means,” and, by so 
doing, “encourages us to view and 
hear music in certain ways, and pre-
cludes us from viewing it and hear-
ing it in other ways” (40). Mashed 
Up then sets out the structure of 
the modern framework in a series 
of binaries: art/craft, artist/audi-
ence, original/copy, performance/
composition, figure/ground, and 
materials/tools. In describing the 
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social function of these binaries, 
Sinnreich is most at home in the 
distinction between being-pro-
vided-for and contribution, where 
the modern framework stabilizes 
the function of scarce musical pro-
duction and passive musical con-
sumption. The artist/audience 
binary, for example, interfered 
with “art’s traditional function as 
the repository of a shared cultural 
lexicon,” thereby “erecting high 
barriers to cultural participation” 
and serving as an “obvious par-
allel” with “the production/con-
sumption binary” (66). Disrupting 
the stability of these binaries, for 
Sinnreich, is what he calls configu-
rable culture—the convergence of 
communication technology and 
culture that, among other proper-
ties, makes all cultural production 
storable, editable, and customiz-
able (in short, reconfigurable) on a 
single platform. The study’s task is 
to work through the effects of this 
cultural emergence on the modern 
framework.
In the second section of Mashed 
Up, Sinnreich examine these 
changes by presenting and analyz-
ing interviews with mashup art-
ists, musicians, and music industry 
members. Each chapter addresses 
one of the binaries established in 
the first section. The interviews are 
themselves fascinating, and Sinn-
reich’s interpretations of their mean-
ing are astute and well qualified. If 
two themes emerge throughout, 
they are, first, that the beliefs and 
practices of practitioners are in a 
state of transition from the mod-
ern framework and, second, that 
new values immanent to mashup 
practices are emerging. What is 
appearing, in other words, is an in-
termediate space, the gray area, be-
tween the binary oppositions. It is 
itself undergoing a process of defi-
nition. On the originality/copy bi-
nary, for example, Sinnreich states 
that “[d]espite the many shades of 
gray emerging between the poles 
of the modern framework’s origi-
nal/copy binary, stylistic originality 
remains a vital concern for many 
configurable musicians” (146). 
Those markers include criteria 
like “selection and arrangement of 
source material, temporal and spa-
tial arrangement of sonic materi-
als, transformative technique, and 
overarching compositional and or-
ganizational sensibility” (146). On 
the performance/composition bi-
nary, the interviews similarly dem-
onstrate that the “distinction . . . 
has become nearly impossible to 
identify” (158), while DJs never-
theless either develop “taxonomic 
criteria” or “claim to encompass the 
entire musical labor cycle” (158). 
Sinnreich’s target throughout this 
section is the limiting and limited 
legal frameworks to which such 
rich and complex production pro-
cesses are often submitted.
Whereas the second section 
contains Sinnreich’s primary ex-
amination of mashup practices, the 
third section moves to assessment: 
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it seeks to determine whether and 
to what extent the dialectical action 
between regulation and resistance 
may transform cultural under-
standings and practices of music. 
Sinnreich presents a measured 
analysis of the complexity of this 
field, addressing the way mashup 
practices depart from and enter 
into traditional institutional rela-
tionships and categories. The final 
chapter develops five “premises” for 
the “cultural logic of configurabil-
ity” (196). These include a “reorien-
tation of the relationship between 
the individual and the collective” 
(196); a “newly flexible workforce 
that both bears the burden and the 
benefits of free agency” (198); a re-
organization of the public and the 
private (199–200); the emergence 
of “recursive [rather than linear] 
modes of narration, analysis, and 
other epistemological processes” 
(202); and a “fifth general principle” 
called DJ Consciousness. The last 
premise constitutes the subjectiv-
ity of configurable culture, shaped 
and interacting with the other con-
ditions; it is a consciousness that 
recognizes itself as sharing in a col-
lective marginalization “by princi-
ples of aesthetic exceptionalism, the 
division of musical labor, and the 
propertization of expression that 
characterized the modern frame-
work,” but also a consciousness that 
recognizes forms of “embracing 
self-ness and other-ness through 
reconfiguring and reimagining our 
cultural environments” (203). It is a 
consciousness confronting itself in 
novel ways, awash in “a new flu-
idity,” in which we “confront our 
public selves through the monitor 
of a surveillance camera or a Face-
book profile editor” while having 
the “ability to retrieve, reconfigure, 
and redistribute such information, 
and in so doing, to participate in 
the production of shared meaning” 
(204).
Mashed Up is certainly among 
the most detailed and thoughtful 
of any current work on particu-
lar sites of open source culture. If 
Sinn reich is careful to draw from 
his analysis a gray area and a se-
ries of potentialities (which is to 
say, Sinnreich insists on the transi-
tional character of our understand-
ings and practices of music), the 
book itself might be seen as simi-
larly transitional in its discursive 
positioning. By establishing the 
dialectical forces as a matter of reg-
ulation and resistance, Sinnreich 
almost necessarily falls back on 
the contestations between configu-
rable culture and a legal apparatus 
of intellectual property. Certainly, 
his subject matter requires that 
these contestations be part of the 
discussion; in music, perhaps more 
so than in other areas of contribu-
tion, the legal disputes are front 
and center. Yet the clash between 
restrictive (and outmoded) legal 
concepts and resistant cultural 
practices has been the primary way 
of framing these disputes in open 
source discourse, and it comes at 
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some cost. Specifically, the prac-
tices of the culture tend to take 
on an almost heroic appearance, 
where the power that impinges on 
them is extrinsic, as is the power 
they exercise. Foucault described 
one of his main objectives as “dis-
covering why the West has insisted 
for so long on seeing the power it 
exercises as juridical and negative 
rather than as technical and posi-
tive.”5 Framing the contest between 
regulation and resistance almost 
inevitably replays this problem. At 
the same time, Sinnreich departs 
significantly from the by now ex-
pected struggle between music in-
dustry copyright lawyers and DJs. 
He does so by outlining, in more 
detail and with more insight than 
most, the emerging power rela-
tions within configurable culture, 
whether understood as develop-
ing aesthetic criteria that supplant 
the modern framework or as the 
premises for a new cultural logic. 
In this way, Mashed Up moves be-
yond the stasis of the copyright and 
intellectual property battles, even if 
it falls back into them for rhetori-
cal purposes. If the mashup artists 
are themselves colonizing the gray 
areas between the binaries of the 
discursive framework, Sinnreich’s 
own text might be said to stake its 
position in the binary between the 
“juridical and negative” and the 
“technical and positive.” DJ Con-
sciousness, in this sense, seems to 
designate both a romantic subject 
resisting an external power and the 
conflicted subject that Stiegler de-
scribes, poised between the crum-
bling solidarity of the industrial 
moment and the reunion of labor 
in a digital domain. Given the cur-
rent configuration of legal restric-
tions and emergent cultural forms, 
this may be the only transitional 
position to occupy responsibly.
The need to address that config-
uration may also be why the ques-
tion of the second clause in Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s proclamation is 
probably unanswerable at this time. 
The three texts considered here all 
posit open source culture as at the 
very least a set of practices with the 
potential for democratizing the po-
litical or reshaping the economic 
through increased participation 
or contribution establishing an al-
ternative to the present. That par-
ticipation would present such an 
appearance is owing, in no small 
part, to the condition of being-
provided-for that characterized 
the industrial economy and its state 
partner. When placed against the 
backdrop of being-provided-for as 
a form of passivity, and passive con-
sumption in particular, contribu-
tion no doubt appears in a positive 
light. But contribution has many 
vectors. The way we contribute 
to the media sphere is just one. It 
may be tempting, then, to assume a 
mantle of Adornian gloom. Given 
the seamless coemergence of these 
forms of contribution—from the 
mashup to the 401(k), from free and 
open source practices to neoliberal 
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finance and the collapse of the wel-
fare state—one might simply offer 
a quasi reversal of the maxim, the 
axiomatic quality of production 
remaining constant but the direc-
tion of its strategies inverted: “Ev-
eryone may contribute so that none 
may escape.” But this, too, would 
oversimplify the complexity of the 
emerging forms and practices. The 
three texts here accomplish some-
thing dramatic by presenting the 
complexity of this field of objects 
and relationship, indeed, by intro-
ducing new objects and relation-
ships into that field. The task for 
criticism going forward will be to 
wrangle with that complexity.
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